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ABSTRACT
Improvements in aviation technology have led to considerable growth of domestic
and international flights worldwide especially during the past four decades. Commercial flights have increased the movement of and have connected people from virtually
all corners of the globe since the end of World War II to exceed 3 billion passengers a
year since 2013: a sizable proportion of the global human population. Flight times have
decreased considerably from the onset of commercial aviation and the range of airliners has extended substantially. A passenger harboring an infectious agent embarking a
flight on one continent can be deplaning on another continent well within half a days’
time, in many cases, before manifesting any symptoms of disease. Furthermore, close
proximity of passengers, some perhaps immunocompromised, during extended transcontinental flights, combined with relatively low air humidity (10-20%) and limited air
replacements in the pressurized cabin may facilitate exchange of airborne infections.
Respiratory pathogens including Mycobacterium tuberculosis, SARS coronavirus, human
influenza and parainfluenza viruses and most recently SARS-CoV-2 are most likely candidates to convert aircrafts into atypical, unwitting fomites. Other infectious diseases such
as enteric pathogens with an incubation time longer than the duration of any given flight
may permit their asymptomatic host to rapidly disseminate an epidemic within or across
continents. In this article we review documented precedents, engineering controls on
commercial airliners and additional security measures employed on the ground intended to mitigate infectious disease spread and transmission potential through air travel.

Introduction
Following the Wright brothers’ first powered flights in 1903,
technological advancements in aeronautics have enabled aircraft
to overcome distances that would have taken many months or
weeks to complete by terrestrial modes in a matter of hours by air
[1]. Commercial aircraft carry over 3 billion passengers annually
[2] and provide transport not only for cargo and people but also
infectious disease. Smallpox, measles, tuberculosis, SARS and
seasonal influenza are documented to have been transmitted during
commercial flights [3]. Infections may be spread within aircrafts
through close contact and by mean of large droplets; airborne
spread through small-particle aerosols (as in the case of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome [SARS]), through contaminated food
or infectious disease vectors (insects, rodents or parasites). Perhaps
the greatest concern for global health is the ability of a person with
a contagious illness to travel virtually to any part of the world

within 24 hours and spread disease across considerable distances
[4]. Infected passengers can arrive at their destination during an
asymptomatic incubation period and transmit disease without
detection [5]. The first decade of the 21st century witnessed the
emergence and worldwide spread of two major global epidemics:
SARS in 2003 a H1N1 Influenza Virus pandemic of 2009 [6] and
most recently the global SARS-CoV-2 pandemic [7]. In all three
cases diseases rapidly spread across the globe in a matter of weeks
to months, a process linked directly to long-distance traffic routes
over which infected individuals dispersed infectious agents [2,8].
Other pathogens typically transmitted via person-to-person contact
documented to have spread by air travel include Adenovirus, SARSAssociated Coronavirus, Rhinovirus, Human Metapneumovirus,
Respiratory Syncytial Virus, Mycoplasma pneumoniae, and
Legionella species [4].
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Despite many respiratory pathogens being primarily transmitted
through direct contact and large droplet spread, few such as
Mycoplasma pneumoniae, Influenza Virus, and Measles Virus may
also be transmitted through airborne routes [9]. Opportunities for
disease spread associated with commercial flight are considerable
and include contact with contaminated fomites (counter tops, seats,
trays, handrails, toilets, etc.), from close-quarters movement of the
passengers while boarding, seating proximity during the flight,
or in waiting areas or lines before boarding or after deplaning
[10]. Increases in arthropod-borne viruses (Arboviruses) spread
have been, in part, attributed to increased air travel harboring
mosquito vectors which carry West Nile, Japanese Encephalitis,
Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, Rift Valley Fever, Dengue, Yellow
Fever, Chikungunya, and Zika [11]. However, most commonly
reported diseases transmitted on aircraft have been spread by the
fecal-oral route via contaminated food. A total of 41 in-flight foodborne outbreaks resulting in 11 deaths were documented between
1947 and 1999 [12]. The most commonly implicated culprits are
salmonellae, shigellae, and Vibrio cholerae. Although incidence of

transmission of infectious diseases by contagious co-passengers
remains relatively uncommon [13], International Health Protection
Authorities are encouraged to join forces and focus on the problem
of epidemic spread via civil aviation because contamination of
aircraft by infected passengers is an alarming, documented reality
and cause of concern in the absence of World Health Organization
(WHO) guidelines for disinfection of pathogenic agents on aircraft
[14].

Air Travel

Air travel appears to have been a dream of the earliest human
civilizations as evidenced by the commonly represented winged
human archetypes in art and paintings and myths of human
flight (notably Icarus) provide evidence of an ancient aspiration
to effortlessly cover vast distances with the ease. Early attempts
to imitate the natural flight of birds were constrained by limits
of human anatomy and physiology. Designs of failed attempts
revealed an incomplete understanding of aerodynamics and
ineffective power to weight ratios that kept early attempts at flight
grounded. Not until the Wright brothers combined their mechanical
expertise with an engine capable of delivering sufficient power to
provide necessary aerodynamic lift did humans finally launch the
era of air travel. The first flights at Kitty Hawk in North Carolina
(USA) laid the foundation for technological developments which
led to considerable improvements in aerospace engineering and
eventually ventures into space. Along the way, air travel presented
challenges to the first aeronautic explorers; drafty, unheated,
unpressurized flights required flyers to dress warmly to combat
cold and carry oxygen to survive the hypoxic atmosphere of high
altitudes [1].
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Modern commercial passenger cabins, however, are regulated
by an environmental system that controls pressurization,
temperature, ventilation, and air filtration [12] and provide a
comfortable flying experience for the masses. The comforts of
modern air travel support a global air transportation network with
over three billion passengers travelling between more than 4000
airports on more than 50 million flights a year. This unprecedented
mobility effectively connects all corners of the populated globe via
airways transporting goods, cargo, and people but also plays an
important role in worldwide spread of infectious diseases [15-19]
Modern airports, all fewer than 18 hours apart, serve not only as
nodes of transport but also transit points for the worldwide spread
of disease [20].

Infectious Diseases

Infectious diseases have played a significant role in the rise and
fall of human civilization since prehistoric times. William H. McNeill
(1976) elegantly describes the role of human development in the
selection and dissemination of infectious disease in Plagues and

Peoples. Yersinia pestis, the bacterium responsible for the plague,
for example, was able to thrive and prolong its European spread into
the 14th and 15th century due to dispersion of asymptomatic carriers
trying to escape the foci of disease and unwittingly transmitting
the contagion to naïve populations. Likewise, Spanish explorers
introduced smallpox chickenpox, and measles to Native American
populations who had no immunity against these pathogens with
catastrophic consequences. Exposure to these never-before seen
infections contributed considerably to the downfall of ancient
empires of the New World brought to ruin by a combination of
conventional and biological warfare. The conquering Europeans,
in return, acquired Treponema pallidum, the spirochete that causes
the sexually transmitted disease syphilis, and spread the infection
throughout the Old World over subsequent centuries causing
disfiguring morbidity and death among rulers and peasants alike.

Historical Spread of Infectious Disease by Intercontinental Travel

Prior to the advent of industrialization, intercontinental
voyages required months at sea. Travelers displaying disease
symptoms that could not be addressed by the modest medical
means available during a voyage were often dispatched overboard
without reaching their destination. This selected for the spread
of infectious diseases that could remain asymptomatic for longer
times. Ignorance of the germ theory made it impossible to recognize
the cause of disease contagion, this assisted infectious agents
overcoming long journeys, in some cases, without the realization of
the ignorant hosts. Technological advances shortened travel times
and brought about the advent of epidemics spreading faster such
as the 1918-1920 influenza pandemic which infected 500 million
people worldwide with an estimated 50 to 100 million deaths [21].
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Faster transit times allowed infected passengers to traverse vaster
distances spreading contagion not only to fellow travelers before
any symptoms appeared but also at their port of arrival. Perhaps
not coincidentally, onset of flu symptoms is more rapid than that
of the diseases that had spread by mean of transatlantic voyage
across the Atlantic during the previous centuries such as the 8
documented cholera pandemics [22].

Contemporary spread of disease by air travel. Air travel has
become the principal mean of transcontinental travel over the
past century. Commercial aviation became regulated by the Air
Commerce Act of 1926 and has since grown to a multibillion-dollar
industry that transports an estimate 3.6 billion passengers across
the globe annually. The impact of commercial aviation is multifold
and ranges from environmental effects resulting in the release of
781 million tons of CO2 released in the atmosphere annually. One
other unintended outcome resulting from the growth of air travel is
the spread of infectious diseases and the rapid and unprecedented
long-range dissemination of microbial agents across the globe.
Asymptomatic passengers harboring a pathogen or parasite can
easily thwart medical officials at airports of origin and destination;
disembark many thousand miles away within a manner of hours or
a day and function as a vector for spread of disease. Furthermore,
passengers remaining in close contact during long intercontinental
journeys are at increased risk of transmission of infectious diseases
in the flight cabin. Infectious disease spread by four main routes:
direct physical contact, though the air, by mean of inanimate objects
(fomites) or contaminated food/water, and by infected arthropod
vectors. However, successful spread of contagion to naive hosts
depends on numerous additional factors such as virulence of the
microorganism, resistance to ambient conditions, length of time
outside of host, ability of the organisms to adhere to and survive on
inanimate surfaces, duration of exposure, environmental conditions
(ventilation, humidity, temperature); and host-specific factors such
as general health and immune status [23-26].

Commercial Flight Travel Conditions

Modern airliners provide a unique environment where

susceptible passengers are exposed to each other for prolonged
periods of time in close quarters and shared facilities. A full capacity
commercial airliner affords among the smallest volumes of air per
person of virtually any enclosed public place. At cruising altitudes,
the cabin air supply is a mixture of external atmospheric air and
recirculated cabin air forced through High Efficiency Particulate Air
(HEPA) filters that remove particles > 0.3 microns. Approximately
half of the air in a commercial airplane cabin is drawn from the
exterior through the jet engines, run through compressors and
fed into the aircrafts air-condition system where it mixes with
recirculated cabin air before circulating through HEPA filters.
Though the external air supply at altitude is assumed to be sterile,
these filters ensure the removal of dust, vapors, bacteria, and fungi.
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HEPA filters also effectively capture viral particles spread by droplet
nuclei [24,27]. Modern aircraft are equipped with environmental
control systems that produce laminar (side to side) circulation of
cabin air [12]. Air enters the cabin from overhead, circulates across
the aircraft and exits the cabin near the floor. Longitudinal (front
to back) airflow is limited, effectively giving rise to sections of air
flow in the cabin which prevent spread of airborne particles [12].
Despite these controls, passengers remain vulnerable to airborne
transmission as evidenced by multiple documented cases of incabin spread of infectious disease.

Measles, An Example of Transmission by Direct Contact

During typical flight conditions, passengers are exposed to
the greatest risk of disease transmission because of high-person
density and close proximity [12]. This greatly facilitates disease
spread of, for example, measles, because transmission can occur
during the earliest (prodromal) stages of illness when a passenger
might be unaware of their condition. Measles is a highly contagious
viral infection transmitted by direct contact via infectious droplets
[28] that has been nearly eradicated from the United States as a
result of aggressive vaccination campaigns [12]. However, cases
continued to be reported as a result of infected individuals traveling
into the US from countries where measles has remained endemic
and as a result of failure to adhere to preventive recommendations
[29]. Seven cases of secondary measles linked to an index case
as a result of in-transit exposure were reported in 1982. In one
such case a passenger spread the virus in the flight cabin while
five other individuals were infected at a common departure gate
[30]. That same year, two passengers were infected by a separate
index passenger on a flight from Venezuela to Miami and 8 cases
of in-flight transmitted measles were reported during a flight
from New York to Tel Aviv in 1994. Between 1996 and 2000, 30%
of measles cases imported into the US were estimated to be from
people who travelled while experiencing symptoms of the disease.
In June 2005, an unvaccinated traveler was identified as the source
of a measles outbreak in Brazil [28]. The index case was originally
exposed to measles in the Maldives and during subsequent flights
transmitted the disease to two secondary cases, both of whom were
unvaccinated [28].

Tuberculosis Spread Through Small Droplets
Tuberculosis (TB) is a significant cause of mortality and
morbidity with millions of new cases reported each year [31]. WHO
guidelines indicate that sitting within two rows of an infectious
passenger on flights lasting more than 8 hours is sufficient for TB
transmission [32]. The United States Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) conducted investigations of seven index
cases that had flown between 1992 and 1994 [9]. Transmission was
detected in 2 crew members who had worked in close proximity
with an index case for at least 12 hours and 4 passengers who
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were seated in the same cabin section as another index case on
a flight lasting longer than 8 hours [9]. These findings support
the conclusion that transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis
on flights is similar to exposure during other activities where
prolonged contact with potentially infectious individuals occurs.
Though awareness and screening programs have raised awareness
of the risk of transmission, TB remains a public health concern
and recently made news in Ireland where 24 commercial flights
associated with infectious cases of TB were reported between 2011
and 2014 [33].

Airborne Influenza Virus

Influenza spread mediated by air travel and inflight
transmission are well documented [34-36] and likely responsible
for ever-mutating strains circumnavigating the globe. The first case
was reported in 1979 and resulted in 72% of all passengers aboard
the airline contracting influenza A. An inoperative ventilation
system and 3-hour flight delay was likely the cause for the high
transmission rate observed. A second study reported 55 cases of
transmission in 1989 during a military flight from Puerto Rico to
Florida. In 1999, 15 mine workers developed symptoms within 4
days after having been seated within five rows of an index case.

Aerosolized SARS Virus

In 2003, air travel facilitated the rapid spread of the SARS virus
from East Asia to over 25 countries along global airline networks.
SARS likely originated in Guangdong Province of the People’s
Republic of China and was spread by infected travelers worldwide.
The disease is believed to be transmitted by aerosolized droplets,
but airborne or small droplet transmission is thought to explain the
distribution of SARS on commercial airlines [12]. Of the thousands
of SARS cases documented during the outbreak in 2003, one
reported the introduction of SARS into Vietnam by a businessman
flying from China via Hong Kong SAR [31]. Dissemination of the
infection led to SARS cases reported in Singapore, Beijing, Canada,
Germany, France and other countries with in-flight transmission
being the most likely cause of spread [37].

SARS-Cov-2 Pandemic

On December 31st, 2019, the WHO announced the first
COVID-19 case as a result of a novel coronavirus identified in
a group of patients in Wuhan, Hubei Province in China [38]. The
virus spread through human-to-human to other Chinese provinces
and countries through infected travelers. In spite of a quarantine
imposed on travel in and out of Wuhan on January 23rd, 2020 an
estimated 5 million residents had been reported to already have
left the city [39]. By February 19, 2020 COVID-19 cases began
to be reported in 16 countries across the globe suggestive that
airline travel is likely to have contributed to the rapid spread of
the SARS-CoV-2 virus worldwide [39]. In spite of numerous lockdown measures and travel bans the COVID-19 pandemic continued
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to spread across continents through 2020 and is still on-going at
the time of submission of this report. As of May 2021, 3.25 million
deaths have been reported to the WHO worldwide.

Food-Borne Illness

Reports of meals served by airlines having led to gastroenteritis
during flights are not uncommon. The principal culprits have
been enteric pathogens including salmonellae, shigellae, and
Vibrio cholerae, but other bacteria and viruses have also been
documented to cause food-borne outbreaks during [12,40] listed
43 outbreaks of food poisoning associated with air travel between
1947 and 2007. Salmonella was the most commonly identified
pathogen transmitted on board commercial flights [22,41].
However, instances of gastrointestinal illness caused V. cholerae
contaminated food or water consumed by passengers during air
travel occasionally surface [41-43]. The Centers for Disease Control
attest that virtually all reported cases of cholera in the United
States are acquired by air travel from regions where the disease
is endemic and therefore imported. The first documented case
occurred in 1972 on a flight from London to Sydney with 1 fatality
in 47 passengers affected [42]. Furthermore, the South American
epidemic of the early 1990s reached the United States in February
1992 when 75 passengers on a flight from Lima Peru to Los Angeles,
California contracted the disease from cold seafood salad served on
the flight; 10 were hospitalized and one died [43].
African Swine Fever (ASF) is caused by the ASF Virus (ASFV)
which is transmitted by direct contact with fluids and excretions
from infected animals. Other common means of ASFV infection are
the bites of infected ticks, and the indirect contact with various
contaminated fomites and pork products, where ASFV remains
infectious for long periods. As an example, ASFV infectivity persists
more than 1000 days in frozen meat [44]. This long ASFV persistence
explains that the introduction of contaminated pork meat or
other swine products from international transports has been
hypothesized to be the way of introduction in Europe; specifically,
to Portugal in 1957, to Cuba in 1971, to Brazil in 1978, Belgium in
1985 [45] and, as recently as 2007 to Georgia [46]. These examples
illustrate how long-distance air travel can infect individuals at far
distances by not only carrying infected passengers but also by
transporting infected food products.

Asymptomatic Carriers

In January of 2010 Haiti experienced a 7.0 magnitude
earthquake followed by >50 aftershocks which caused considerable
damage to the capital Port-au-Prince and the deaths of an estimated
230,000 people; a total of 3 million Haitians were affected by the
earthquake. Within a short time of the earthquake rescue and relief
efforts began pouring into the country from all corners of the globe
but with moderate success; six months after the quake as much as
98% of the rubble remained uncleared and thousands of bodies
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buried under debris. In mid-October or 2010 Haiti experienced the
onset of perhaps the largest cholera epidemic in recent times; up
to date over 818,000 cases and 9,753 deaths were reported by the
Haitian government in 2018 and the epidemic has still lingering
effects. The gram-negative bacterium Vibrio cholerae was not
endemic to the island of Hispaniola as no cholera cases have been
reported in modern times giving rise to suspicions that this enteric
pathogen had been unwittingly imported from elsewhere. This
was confirmed by genomic analysis of the bacteria from patient
diarrhea revealing a South Asian origin of the epidemic strain [47].

Further investigations employing an epidemiological approach,
not unlike that used by John Snow to pinpoint the origin of a
cholera epidemic that ravaged the Soho district of London in 1854,
confirmed that the source of the Haiti cholera outbreak upstream
of the Artibonite river – a major source of Haitian drinking water
[48]. Nepalese UN peacekeeping forces encampment contaminated
the river by several means: leaky pipes, waste dumping and an
open septic pit near the Artibonite. The soldiers were not tested
for cholera although they were flown to Haiti from a region in
Nepal where a cholera outbreak was ongoing. Evidently, they were
not sufficiently symptomatic to rouse suspicion and were able to
board a plane and reach their destination functioning as a vector
for disease spread across the globe. This example also reinforces
an often-overlooked notion that diseases such as cholera may be
harbored in a nearly or fully asymptomatic carrier state by some
individuals facilitating dissemination, especially via air travel.
The SARS-CoV-2 is also likely to have spread sizably as a result
of asymptomatic carriers through air travel. This is perhaps best
illustrated by a study that followed a group of 24 asymptomatic
tourists exposed to a hotel manager (who later tested positive
for COVID-19) flying from Tel Aviv, Israel to Frankfurt, Germany
in March 2020 [49]. While none of the travelers displayed any
symptoms or received a diagnosis of COVID-19 before embarking
in the 4 hour and 40 minutes flight, subsequent testing for SARSCoV-2 produced 7 positives by Real Time Polymerase Chain
Reaction (RT-PCR) and 4 of them became symptomatic during the
flight. Furthermore, 7 additional passengers unrelated to the group

of 24 reported COVID-19 symptoms within 14 days of travel. While
the methodology employed in this study does not rule out alternate
explanations, the possibility that in-flight transmission of SARSCoV-2 took place from originally asymptomatic carriers cannot be
ruled out and appears likely from the rapid world-wide spread of
the COVID-19 pandemic [39].

Vector Borne Disease Transmission

In addition to human passengers, animals regularly transported
on aircraft may harbor infectious diseases or carry infected vectors
such as mosquitoes, fleas, ticks and other arthropods. As many as
87 cases of “airport malaria”, caused primarily by the protozoan
parasite Plasmodium falciparum, occurring in and around airports
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among people who have not travelled to endemic areas evidence
that malaria-carrying mosquitoes are transported by aircraft
[50,51]. Dengue, Chikungunya and yellow fever, viruses also spread
by mosquitoes have also been recognized to be transmitted via
aircraft [50,52]. Serotype analysis of thousands of dengue cases
in Europe and the US point to successive imports of Asian strains
coinciding with increased air travel from the 1960s onwards [52].
Chikungunya virus first appeared on the Kenyan coast in 2004
and subsequently emerged in succession on small islands in the
Western Indian Ocean [53]. A massive epidemic followed, affecting
an estimated 6.9 million in India that swept eastward to Southeast
Asia, with cases documented as far as Italy in 2007 [52].

Management

Early recognition and appropriate infection control measures
can help to mitigate the transmission of infectious agents under
the authority of international policies and sovereign laws and
regulations. These measures range from issuing travel alerts to
quarantine or isolation of passengers at risk. Though airlines may
refuse to carry passengers due to health concerns, systematic
screening of all passengers is costly, time-consuming, and
impractical [54]. Prevention of disease outbreak is best achieved
by educating travelers of the risks associated with voyaging when
ill and taking precautionary measures such as vaccination when
travelling to regions with endemic disease. Good hand-washing
hygiene has been proven to reduce the risk of disease transmission
and should be promoted during air travel [55]. Body substance
isolation practices are standard practice in healthcare and may
prove to benefit crew or fellow passengers who are at risk of
exposure. Although masks [56] have been proven to be effective
in the healthcare setting, their use is not well studied in disease
control aboard aircraft. Nevertheless, a mask could be made
available for passengers suspected of having infectious diseases
such as SARS or COVID-19 and procedures should be in place in
the event of the necessity for isolation. Notification of risk exposure
is warranted for passengers and crew who have been exposed to
infectious disease aboard commercial aircraft. This is typically
limited to flights lasting longer than 8 hours and is dependent upon
the design of the aircraft, flight origin and destination, and health
department recommendations.

Risk Assessment

Risk assessment is complicated by multiple factors that affect
transmission of infectious disease in aircrafts. Investigations of
tuberculosis spread on flights provide data that suggest that risk
of disease transmission to other passengers is proportional to
proximity and length of exposure [9]. However, confounding these
criteria are studies that report variations such as one outbreak of
SARS were passengers seated as far as seven rows from the source
were affected [10,56]. Further complicating risk determination is
the role cabin ventilation plays in disease transmission. Proper
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ventilation in confined spaces reduces the concentration of airborne
contagion logarithmically [57,58]. The laminar flow within the
cabin prevents longitudinal spread and combined with frequent air
exchange through HEPA filtration limits transmission of contagion
from one cabin section to another [12]. However, when ventilation
system is not operating optimally, chance of transmission can
increase. In-flight passenger movement also affects the risk of
disease transmission. The movement of fellow passengers, crew,
and that of an index patient can modify exposure risks and influence
the risk distribution for transmission events [59]. Combining
epidemiological data with mathematical models of proximity and
ventilation may assist demonstrating the interrelationship of these
factors and how they affect disease transmission [12]. Thus far, such
models have demonstrated that the risk of in-flight tuberculosis
transmission is reduced by half when ventilation rate is doubled
and exponentially reduced when passengers are seated 15 seats
from the infectious source [60].

Aircraft Maintenance

In addition to preventive measures which include public health
education, screening, and response policy, commercial airlines have
implemented on-ground and in-flight control measures to reduce
the risk of transmission. Every aircraft undergoes cleaning based
on standard cleaning procedures prior to the next departure [14].
Neither aircraft manufacturers nor the WHO have provided standard
recommendations for cleaning aircraft [32] or safe disinfection.
The absence of standard guidelines leaves room for adaptation of
best practices, conclusions from new findings, real-life experiences,
and circumstances to best deal with life-threatening diseases [14].
The disinfection of aircraft by vector control prior to landing,
vector control around airports, and immunization requirements
have been shown to be effective in preventing outbreaks in nonendemic areas. This appears particularly important as sporadic
Ebola virus epidemics have emerged recurrently in West Africa
over the past decade. Unfortunately, only five countries practice
standard disinfection even though International Health Regulations
recommend disinfecting and insect removal of all aircraft traveling
from countries with vector-borne diseases [61-64].

Conclusion

Continued growth of global air travel is intrinsically and
unescapably linked to an increased risk of infectious disease
spread and therefore a contributing factor towards the emergence
and dispersal of pandemic disease. It is impossible to predict what
infectious agent will cause the next pandemic, but it is likely that air
travel will contribute to its spread. Social mitigation strategies are
difficult to implement without legislating unenforceable rules that
infringe on personal freedoms at several levels while continuous
ramping up of engineering controls is costly and challenging to
deploy. Business can increasingly be transacted through real-time
on-line transmission as the emergence of internet-based video-
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transmission platforms has demonstrated during the COVID-19
pandemic. Pre-travel health screens for common diseases in
endemic regions would be reasonable to implement and would
alleviate spread of numerous infectious agents. Practices that
include the consumption of bush meat, handling of wild-caught
animals, the illicit trade of pets and other animal parts represent the
potential origins of a wide range of emerging infectious agents can
only be effectively halted through public outreach and education
campaigns.

Therefore, the most effective strategy in limiting the spread
of infectious agents through air travel and other means will entail
sensibilizing and educating the general public about health risks
associated with travel, on the emergence of infectious agents and
personal measures to be taken to prevent acquisition of microbial
agents. The challenge of the 21st century to bridge the ever-growing
knowledge gap between the continuously expanding technological
developments and the still swelling global population of end
users of these technologies remains considerable. Engineering,
biology, chemistry, physics, electronics, informatics and numerous
other sub-disciplines continue to build on previous discoveries
and breakthroughs while global educational efforts fragment
and partition this massive knowledge bank into small units to
meet employment needs. An educational emphasis on holistic
understanding that allows students and the population at large to
synthesize and analyze information received through an enormous
flood of broadcasts through the internet in a manner will help our
civilization to ameliorate personal decision making and improve
the human condition as a whole.
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